Zlatan писал(а) 03 апр 2013, 13:40:Один мой знакомый ходит мрачнее тучи. Он относится как бы к "средним вкладчикам", то есть к тем, кто держал больше 100 тыс., но меньше миллиона евро на Кипре. Как я слышал, в основном такие, а также те, у которых стольник и больше в основном и пострадали. Крупняки, получив инсайдерскую информацию в основном деньги и вывели.
Не планировал писать здесь о непроверенных данных, но сегодня прочитал нижеследующее:
"...Президент "Газпромбанка" Андрей Акимов закрыл депозит в 2 млн евро в проблемном кипрском банке Laiki 6 марта, за 9 дней до того, как кипрские власти объявили о «стрижке» депозитов и заморозили счета, пишет во вторник Financial Times. Имя Акимова есть в списке из более чем сотни юридических и трех физических лиц, которые вывели более 500 млн евро из Laiki за две недели до 15 марта....
....В опубликованном газетой Haravghi списке упоминается также украинский миллиардер Ринат Ахметов, ....его компании вывели $30 млн из банка Laiki в первые две недели марта. Представитель холдинга Ахметова в комментарии британской газете не отрицает закрытие счета накануне кризиса, но объясняет это тем, что многие финансисты делали прогнозы о негативном сценарии для финансовой ситемы Кипра.
По данным Forbes, на кипрских счетах "Газпромбанка" заморожена не очень крупная сумма в 25 млн евро. Банк на запросы Forbes не отвечает."
Да какая инсайдерская информация. Все давно уже в газетах написали. Вот февральская статья Financial Times. Подписка, кстати, всего 600 евро в год, а кому то бабло помогло спасти
February 10, 2013 8:58 pm
Radical rescue proposed for Cyprus
By Peter Spiegel in Brussels and Quentin Peel in Berlin
A radical new option for the financial rescue of Cyprus would force losses on uninsured depositors in Cypriot banks, as well as investors in the country’s sovereign bonds, according to a confidential memorandum prepared ahead of Monday’s meeting of eurozone finance ministers.
The proposal for a “bail-in” of investors and depositors, and drastic shrinking of the Cypriot banking sector, is one of three options put forward as alternatives to a full-scale bailout. The ministers are trying to agree a rescue plan by March, to follow the presidential elections in Cyprus later this month.
The new plan has not been endorsed by its authors in the European Commission or by individual eurozone members. The memo warns that “the risks associated with this option are significant”, including a renewed danger of contagion in eurozone financial markets, and premature collapse in the Cypriot banking sector.
The radical proposal is intended to produce a more sustainable debt solution for the country, cutting the size of Cyprus’s bailout by two-thirds – from €16.7bn to only €5.5bn – by involving more foreign depositors and bond holders.
It would reduce Cyprus’s outstanding debt to just 77 per cent of economic output, compared with 140 per cent in the current full bailout plan.
By “bailing in” uninsured bank depositors, it would also involve more foreign investors, especially from Russia, some of whom have used Cyprus as a tax haven in recent years. That would answer criticism from Berlin in particular, where politicians are calling for more drastic action to stop the island being used for money laundering and tax evasion.
Senior EU officials who have seen the document cautioned that imposing losses on bank depositors and a sovereign debt restructuring remain unlikely. Underlining the dissuasive language in the memo, they said that bailing in depositors was never considered in previous eurozone bailouts because of concern that it could lead to bank runs in other financially fragile countries.
But the document also makes clear that both options remain on the table despite public insistence by eurozone leaders that Greece was “unique” and would be the only country to default on sovereign debts.
Labelled “strictly confidential” and distributed to eurozone officials last week, the memo says the radical version of the plan – including a “haircut” of 50 per cent on sovereign bonds – would shrink the Cypriot financial sector, now nearly eight times larger than the island’s economy, by about one-third by 2015.
But the authors warn such drastic action could restart contagion in eurozone financial markets, and put forward two more cautious alternatives.
One more moderate “bail-in” option would involve junior debt holders, but not bank depositors, and would aim to shrink the size of the banking sector by half over 10 years. It would seek to raise corporate income tax to 12.5 per cent (from the current 10 per cent), and increase withholding tax on capital income to 28 per cent. It would also seek to extend the maturities on the €2.5bn loan that Cyprus received from Russia last year.
A third option would allow Cyprus to sell the shares it acquires in its ailing banks to the European Stability Mechanism, once that eurozone rescue fund is allowed to provide direct recapitalisation for banks.
Cyprus’s bailout, while small compared to Ireland, Portugal and Greece, has proven unexpectedly difficult because its size relative to the country’s gross domestic product would increase debt to levels considered unsustainable both by the International Monetary Fund and the German government.
The memo says that without any relief, the bailout would stand at €16.7bn and increase the country’s debt to 140 per cent of GDP by 2015, the end of the three-year programme. That would make it the highest in the eurozone except for Greece.
The document says that the ministers must decide what should be the appropriate debt-to-GDP level for Cyprus. Some have argued for 100 per cent by the end of the programme period (2015), while others believe it would be sufficient to hit that target by 2020, it says.
