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Zivert писал(а) 19 ноя 2012, 11:28:Слава Богу, не сбылось.
Tying Specific Reverses to U.S. Response
A we'll-know-it-when-we-see-it approach is not acceptable for determining what constitutes cause to re-impose sanctions. Congress should reassert its role in Burma policy and set clear expectations for the Administration. Working back from Burma's national elections in 2015, Congress should establish three certification periods and pair Administration reports with the re-imposition of specific sanctions unless specific benchmarks are met:
First Period. During the first period, Burma should:
Grant the International Committee of the Red Cross full access to prisons and follow through on establishment of the effective presence of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. In connection with President Obama's visit, the Burmese government announced commitments in both areas. The Administration should see that it keeps its word.
Release all political prisoners. The Burmese government has thus far released about 800 political prisoners. The 51, including prominent human rights leader Myint Aye, released on the eve of President Obama's November visit, bring the number remaining to 216.[7]
All releases have been conditional, and new political arrests continue even as other prisoners are released. Among the most recent re-arrested and released on bail is U Gambira, organizer of the 2007 Saffron Revolution and a guest of honor at President Obama's speech at Rangoon University.
Negotiate a cease-fire with the Kachin in Northern Burma. The Kachin remain outside the the network of cease-fires that the regime has reached with other ethnic groups. The Burmese government should reach a cease-fire, withdraw troops from Kachin areas, and establish a timetable for a real peace process.
Make progress in establishing formal dialogues between ethnic groups and the government. Without such dialogues, cease-fires will not hold, and a broad, just peace is not possible. Maintaining cease-fires demands movement on underlying issues, particularly constitutional reforms that guarantee an acceptable level of autonomy, empowerment, and resource sharing.[8]
If Burma fails to meet these criteria, the U.S. should:
Oppose assessment missions, technical assistance, and loans from international financial institutions (IFIs). In February 2012, the Administration lifted U.S. opposition to assessment missions from institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. In October, Congress provided additional waiver authority necessary to support new IFI loans.
Second Period. During the second period, Burma should:
Legalize the Rohingya. Nothing in Burma--or Southeast Asia for that matter--has offended the conscience in the past several years like the plight of the Rohingya in Burma's western border state of Rakhine. In addition to ending attacks on the Rohingya in which security forces and local authorities have been complicit,[9]
the government must address the legal issues underlying the Rohingya's suffering. Rohingya who already qualify for citizenship under Burmese law should be given it, and the remainder should be given citizenship or a commensurate protected status.
Extend and codify political reforms. Many of the most widely heralded changes, such as the easing of censorship rules, are tentative. Restrictions on the media and the institutions for enforcing censorship remain. Legal reforms should be carefully examined to ensure that they truly liberalize the Burmese media. Guidelines to the media issued by a government that has effectively unchecked constitutional power to make politically motivated arrests may be a more efficient means of managing opinion, but they will not make the media much freer than pre-publication censorship.
Make progress in guaranteeing rights of expression, association, assembly, and religion. To continue the current open-handed policy, the Administration should be able to certify to Congress at a minimum that there are signs of continuing "progress" across the range of freedoms necessary to ensure the rights of the Burmese people. New laws should truly liberalize, not simply establish more efficient frameworks for determining and enforcing penalties for political crimes.
Demonstrate that it has severed military relations with North Korea. The Burmese government has given repeated assurances on this score. The U.S. needs to vigilantly follow up on the government's commitment. Recent reports about the seizure of components potentially part of a nuclear weapons program from North Korea to Burma are not encouraging.[10]
If Burma fails to meet these criteria, the U.S. should:
Re-impose the ban on investment, retroactive to July 2012, when the restriction was lifted.
Restore the export restrictions on financial services, reverting to the conditions of the general license issued on April 17, 2012. The license made exceptions for not-for-profit activities in basic human needs, democracy building and good governance, education activities, sporting activities, non-commercial development projects directly benefiting the Burmese people, and religious activities.[11]
Third Period. During the third period, Burma should:
Hold elections in 2015 that are "free and fair", as determined by international observers. The Burmese government should allow into the country any reputable international observer group, private or governmental, to certify the elections.
Implement constitutional reform that curbs the military's control over the civilian government. Burma should end the military's guarantee to one-fourth of the seats in the national and local assemblies. This goes directly to the right of the Burmese people to change their government and its ability to carry out further constitutional reform. A democratic victory in 2015 and peace in ethnic areas will be incomplete if the Burmese military retains the power to block government action.
If Burma fails to meet these criteria, the U.S. should:
Re-impose the ban on Burmese imports. Congress renewed the legal basis for the ban on imports in September 2012, and President Obama, in consultation with Congress, waived them in November. This was the last major U.S. sanction on Burma to be lifted.
Zivert писал(а) 13 янв 2013, 16:50:Эх, Россия ушами хлопает по полной программе!!! Лижут наши правители задницы и всё не тем . А Бирма - стратегическое подбрюшье ЮВА.
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